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A Principled Defence of the International  
Human Right to Privacy: 




Frédéric Sourgens’s recent article, The Privacy Principle,1 dares to ask a 
provocative question: can international law regulate global surveillance pro-
grams without sacrificing national security interests?*The need to strike a bal-
ance between privacy and security is of course not new.2 It is perhaps as old as 
the second oldest profession itself.3 Indeed, it was Sir Francis Welsingham, the 
father of modern intelligence agencies, who made the hackneyed statement on 
behalf of Elizabeth I of England concerning the latter’s reservation towards 
surveillance of Catholics and Puritans on a massive scale. Welsingham noted in 
 
 † J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School; Resident Fellow of the Information Society Project; 
Visiting Scholar, Hebrew University Cyber Security Research Center; Robert L. Bernstein International 
Human Rights Fellow at Privacy International. I would like to thank Frédéric Sourgens for bringing our 
lively exchanges over the 2016 Jessup Compromis into a forum fitting of their breadth. I would like to 
also thank the student editors at the Yale Journal of International Law for all of their thoughts and hard 
work surrounding the publication of both pieces. The arguments presented in this paper reflect my own 
thoughts and in no way represent the positions of any of the organizations with which I am associated. 
 1. Frédéric Sourgens, The Privacy Principle, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 345  (2017). 
 2. In Discourses on Livy, Niccolò Machiavelli writes, “as far as the . . . popular desire of re-
covering their liberty, the prince, not being able to satisfy them, must examine what the reasons are that 
make them desire being free . . . . As for the rest, for whom it is enough to live securely, they are easily 
satisfied by making orders and laws that, along with the power of the king, comprehend everyone’s se-
curity. And once a prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly 
begin to live securely and contentedly.” NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY (ca. 1517), re-
printed in NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE CHIEF WORKS AND OTHERS 237 (A. Gilbert trans., 1965). See 
also Benjamin Franklin, Letter to the Pennsylvania Assembly, Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), 
in VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1755-1756, 19-21 (1756) (“Those 
who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor 
Safety”); cf. Benjamin Wittes, What Ben Franklin Really Said, LAWFARE (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ben-franklin-really-said (noting that when read in its original con-
text, the famous quote “does not mean what it seems to say” and suggesting that “Franklin was not de-
scribing some tension between government power and individual liberty. He was describing, rather, ef-
fective self-government in the service of security as the very liberty it would be contemptible to trade. 
Notwithstanding the way the quotation has come down to us, Franklin saw the liberty and security inter-
ests of Pennsylvanians as aligned”). 
 3. Michael J. Barrett, Honorable Espionage II, 2 J. DEF. & DIPL. 12, 14 (1984) (“Espionage 
is the world’s second oldest profession and just as honourable as the first.”). 
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a letter to the Secretary of France that it was her majesty’s repugnance of the 
“tyranny of the Church of Rome” —which used “terror and rigour” to secure 
obedience—that led her to not want “to make windows into men’s hearts and 
secret thoughts.” Instead, Queen Elizabeth opted to amend her laws and restrain 
her own supreme power to surveil, expecting that such an act of self-control 
would bring about “good effects” over time.4 
The world has, however, changed significantly since the sixteenth centu-
ry. For Welsingham, a global mass surveillance program involved “pa[ying] off 
travellers in the ports of Lyon and merchant adventurers in the bazaars of 
Hamburg.”5 It meant diligently running expensive and cumbersome human spy 
rings across the European continent. The advancement of new forms of digital 
communications not only created an ever-more connected and globalized 
world; it also broke the conceptual and practical shackles that restricted the 
work of intelligence agencies. The capacity limitations of the past have been 
replaced by new opportunities for bulk interception, retention, and analysis of 
signals intelligence (SIGINT). Coupled with the emergence of contemporary 
global threats, ranging from the proliferation of WMDs to the rise of trans-
boundary non-state terror groups, it is easy to accept Sourgens’s argument that 
“the collection of remote electronic communications of foreign targets has be-
come the coin of the security realm” and his prediction that intelligence gather-
ing is thus “only going to increase. . . .”6 
In this context, international human rights law (IHRL) is supposed to 
provide limits on the surveillance state, standing tall and sturdy, like a fortified 
wall, against Orwell’s Big Brother. As the ICTY concluded in its famous Tadić 
decision, we have, in the course of recent decades, reoriented the purposes of 
the international security system to take into consideration the rise to pre-
eminence of human rights.7 The universal right to privacy, as one of those core 
rights, is therefore supposed to offer us assurance against unfettered and arbi-
trary interference in our private lives. The combined effect of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the international human rights treaties and treaty 
bodies, the regional human rights courts, and the Human Rights Council’s spe-
cial rapporteurs was supposed to be enough to prevent governments from en-
gaging in wholesale surveillance of entire populations. 
Sourgens’s piece, however, offers a sobering and demystifying account of 
the fault lines of the privacy agenda and human rights discourse. Looking at 
privacy protections from both treaty and customary law perspectives, Sourgens 
concludes that “existing international law approaches to the protection of global 
 
 4. 2 GILBERT BURNET, THE HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 
418-19 (1681). 
 5. Asaf Lubin, Espionage as a Sovereign Right under International Law and Its Limits, 24(3) 
INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N Q. 22, 24-25 (2016). 
 6. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 346-347. 
 7. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (recog-
nizing that the world has witnessed “significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to 
problems besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually 
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa 
omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold 
in the international community as well”). 
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privacy rights face significant hurdles when applied to the digital age of signals 
intelligence, leading to an apparent normative gap in the law.”8 Faced with this 
gap he therefore calls for a paradigm shift through the introduction of a “priva-
cy principle”—a “general principle of law protecting the right to privacy.”9 The 
Article then attempts to prove the existence of this principle, to define its scope 
and nature, and to apply it in context. I wholeheartedly commend Professor 
Sourgens for creatively thinking beyond the conventional legal wisdom to in-
novatively propose a new international legal framework to enhance privacy 
protections in the face of foreign mass surveillance. Nonetheless, I’m afraid I 
do not share his optimism about the existence or value of such a principle and 
believe that its promotion is thus misguided. 
This short response is inevitably selective. Part I offers a brief summary 
of Sourgens’ key arguments and his legal rationales for them. Part II pushes 
against the existence of a general privacy principle. This Part challenges both 
the methodology employed by Sourgens to identify this principle, as well as the 
practicality of the overall endeavor. Part III makes the case for an extraterritori-
al right to privacy under both treaty and customary international law. This Part 
further analyzes recent successes of IHRL in fighting against unwarranted sur-
veillance, and concludes by providing counter-arguments to the concerns raised 
by Sourgens regarding the effectiveness of the human rights discourse in this 
sphere. I conclude my response in Part IV by acknowledging the real need, not-
ed by Sourgens, for a paradigm shift in the discourse on privacy. Despite the 
recent accomplishments, it is nonetheless true, and worth highlighting as Sour-
gens persuasively does, that IHRL activists have not been able to establish suf-
ficient privacy protections against foreign mass surveillance. This Part makes 
the claim that the only solution for the many deficiencies of the human right to 
privacy is to reform human rights thinking and advocacy. Instead of introduc-
ing a new non-enforceable general principle with identical content to that of the 
human right it seeks to supplant, let us reconceptualize the legal content of the 
human right itself. The final concluding Part thus gestures towards a paradig-
matic shift within IHRL by suggesting a controversial, yet far more realistic 
way of applying tailored privacy protections to foreign surveillance, taking into 
consideration the justified needs of States. 
I. A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE IS BORN: ALL HAIL THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLE 
While Sourgens’s Article is comprised of five Parts, I wish to focus my 
response only on the first three, as they lay the foundation and set the narrative 
of the entire piece. In Part I, titled “The Privacy Problem in International Law,” 
Sourgens focuses predominately on the asserted territorial limitations of IHRL 
treaties to prove the inaptitude of the privacy-as-a-right approach. As Sourgens 
notes, 
[o]ne core challenge for the human rights treaty paradigm is the objection lodged by 
the United States that human rights instruments have purely territorial application 
. . . . Contemporary global signals intelligence programs can operate entirely outside 
 
 8. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 348. 
 9. Id. at 349. 
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of the territory of the signatory state. Due to the nature of the internet, this is true 
even for surveillance of a state’s own nationals. Some are therefore concerned that 
such signals intelligence is beyond the reach of the privacy principle codified in the 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)].10 
Sourgens continues by suggesting that “the United States appears to be 
leading a movement of state practice away from a more robust understanding of 
human rights [to] privacy.”11 To establish this claim, he looks to three of the 
four additional permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
(China, Russia, and France).12 Focusing on their recent state practice, Sourgens 
shows that all three are adopting both domestic and foreign surveillance legisla-
tion and policies that challenge global privacy protections.13 On these grounds, 
Sourgens concludes that 
[i]n order to vindicate the existence of privacy rights vis-à-vis the United States 
(and consequently, the NSA), or the super-majority of U.N. Security Council per-
manent members, one needs to look beyond the human rights treaty paradigm. One 
needs to find an alternative way to theorize privacy protections so as to open up a 
second front from which to chip away at standing objections that no global privacy 
rights exists.14 
Parts II and III introduce the privacy principle to fill this regulatory gap. 
To fully grasp the novelty of Sourgens’s claims, it is worth clarifying the dis-
tinction between international human rights law and general principles of inter-
national law.15 Whereas international human rights law is predominantly 
grounded in treaties and the interpretation of treaty bodies and courts, general 
principles are a “co-equal source of international law” that do not require an 
explicit international enactment,16 but instead arise from deep and widespread 
custom and practice in both national and international law. As such, Sourgens 
correctly notes, they can be used to “fill gaps within the fabric of international 
law.”17 In other words, Sourgens contends that the privacy-as-a-right approach 
suffers from the limitations of conflicting interpretations, inadmissibility, and a 
lack of uniform adoption, thus leaving a gap in control. Once recognized, pri-
vacy-as-a-principle would automatically become part of international law prop-
er and could therefore offer a globally binding solution. 
Part II, titled “Proving General Principles of Law” establishes the theoret-
ical framework for verifying the existence of general principles. Relying on the 
 
 10. Id. at 353-54. 
 11. Id. at 358. 
 12. Oddly, Sourgens ignores the United Kingdom, the final P5 member, despite the fact that, 
on its face, its recent state practice seems to bolster his claim even further. The United Kingdom adopted 
the Investigatory Powers Act this past December – rancorously referred to by digital rights activists as 
the “Snooper’s Charter,” as it is one of the most robust and expansive pieces of surveillance legislation 
in the western world. For further reading, see Asaf Lubin, The Investigatory Powers Act and Interna-
tional Law: Part I, UCL J. L. & JURIS. BLOG (Dec. 26, 2016), https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/law-
journal/2016/12/26/the-investigatory-powers-act-and-international-law-part-i/.   
 13. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 358.  
 14. Id. at 359. 
 15. The question of whether each of the human rights enshrined in the corpus of IHRL also 
reflects custom, and within it whether the full content of each right is customary, is a matter of contro-
versy. I believe the right to privacy reflects custom, an argument that Sourgens ignores. This issue is 
discussed further in Section III.B, infra. 
 16. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 349. 
 17. Id. at 367. 
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jurisprudence of both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Part introduces a two-phased test 
for determining the existence of a general principle: (1) whether a “comparative 
legal analysis of relevant legal systems establish[es] a requisite degree of con-
vergence to formulate a common, shared legal principle of domestic laws”18; 
and (2) whether this shared principle of domestic law “is compatible with exist-
ing norms of general international law.”19 In essence, Sourgens embraces a 
“comparativist approach” to establishing the existence of a critical mass of 
convergence amongst domestic legislation, examining “the amount of resource, 
but also of the density, and purity of that resource.”20 
Finally, in Part III, titled “The Privacy Principle,” Sourgens applies this 
theoretical model to prove the existence of his principle. This Part looks at six 
legal systems (those of the United States, France, China, Russia, Iran, and Isra-
el), which Sourgens claims represent geographical and cultural diversity as well 
as significant capacities in signals intelligence.21 Sourgens shows that a critical 
mass of these jurisdictions recognize, in their civil law, that any unconsented-to 
collection or use of “private information is an independent wrongful act in vio-
lation of the right to privacy. . . .”22 To establish that the principle is also com-
patible with existing international law norms, Sourgens relies on IHRL, claim-
ing that the principle is “entirely consistent with existing human rights law and 
jurisprudence. The privacy protections extended by the [p]rivacy [p]rinciple are 
analogous to the interpretation of the right to privacy included in human rights 
treaties.”23 The Article concludes with Parts IV and V, which adopt a working 
definition of privacy under the principle, and apply the principle to the design 
of international surveillance programs, using standards of proportionality. 
II. THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLE: THE PRINCIPLE THAT DIED IN ITS CRIB 
I do not share Sourgens’s position that a privacy principle exists, for three 
primary reasons. First, the privacy principle does not meet the “indispensability 
requirement” under the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ (Section II.A infra). 
Second, Sourgens erroneously bases his privacy principle on a comparative 
analysis of private law in each of the surveyed States while completely ignoring 
public law exceptions (Section II.B infra). Finally, there exists a circular fallacy 
at the stage where Sourgens deems the privacy principle compatible with inter-
national law (Section II.C infra). 
 
 18. Id. at 368. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 372 (quoting Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 104 (2007)). 
 21. Id. at 375-376 (“These jurisdictions capture a reasonable diversity in legal traditions, cover 
a broad geographic range, and encompass a significant cultural diversity. This choice of jurisdictions is 
by no means exhaustive. It is driven by an examination of representative legal systems equipped with 
significant signals intelligence capabilities. An agreement between these global leaders is going to carry 
the greatest authority vis-à-vis possible repeat offenders against the principle in question. It is also the 
likely source of the most engagement with privacy questions at the domestic level given the availability 
of sophisticated technology to these states and the private residents under their jurisdiction.”). 
 22. Id. at 388. 
 23. Id. at 390. 
6 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 42: 2 
 
However, and this is perhaps most important, even if we were to accept 
the existence of the privacy principle, it is, as far as I can see, much ado about 
nothing, as it is unlikely to achieve any of Sourgens’ purported goals.  
A. The Forgotten Indispensability Requirement 
While Sourgens posits a two-phased test for determining the existence of 
a general principle, scholars have identified a third requirement in the jurispru-
dence of the International Court, the requirement of “indispensability.” As not-
ed by Jalet, “it is not because rules or legal principles exist in most, or even in 
every, legal system that they constitute general principles, but because they are 
so basic and fundamental as to compose the substratum from which positive 
rules may be derived.”24 Professor Hersch Lauterpacht defined general princi-
ples as “obvious maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental charac-
ter.”25 Baron Descamps, President of the Advisory Committee that drafted the 
PCIJ Statute, stated that general principles are “the fundamental law of justice 
and injustice deeply engraved on the heart of every human being and which is 
given its highest and most authoritative expression in the legal conscience of 
civilized nations.”26 Professor Gordon Christenson referred to general princi-
ples as “foundational ordering norms in a global interdependent community.”27 
Even Bin Cheng, whom Sourgens cites extensively throughout his piece, rec-
ognized that general principles are “juridical concept[s]” that lie “in the very 
nature of law.”28 
This short literary review suggests that for a general principle to exist, it 
must be indispensable for the functioning of a legal system. General principles 
are cardinal ideas, a core of legal foundational norms. Bassiouni cites, as ex-
amples, the principles of “justice, fairness, equality, and good faith,” as well as 
the notion of “territorial criminal jurisdiction” and the requirement that treaty 
and contract interpretations “be based first on the plain meaning of the 
words.”29 Bassiouni then proceeds to survey the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and 
ICJ to identify even more established general principles, including inter alia, 
the principle of competence-competence,30 the doctrine of nullus commodum 
 
 24. Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civ-
ilized Nations - A Study, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1085-86 (1963); see also Alfred Verdross, Les Princi-
pes Généraux du Droit dans la Jurisprudence Internationale, 52 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 203 (1935) (noting that identifying general principles can be 
achieved without conducting a comparative survey, simply by studying whether a principle is indeed 
indispensable to the existence of a legal system). 
 25. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 69, 
74 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970).  
 26. MAARTEN BOS, A METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1984) (quoting De-
camps). 
 27. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 (1988). 
 28. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 392-94 (1953). 
 29. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International 
Law”, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 772 (1989-1990). 
 30. The general rule that “a body possessing jurisdictional powers has the right in the first 
place itself to determine the extent of its jurisdiction”, reaffirmed by the PCIJ in the Interpretation of the 
Greco-Turkish Agreement of Dec. 1, 1926, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No 16, at 20 (Aug. 28). 
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capere (potest) de sua iniuria propria,31 the principle of reparations derived 
from wrongful acts,32 and the blue pencil doctrine.33 All of these general prin-
ciples are indeed maxims and foundational ordering norms.34 
Now compare these principles with the right to privacy, and in fact any of 
the human rights enumerated in the corpus of IHRL. What you will find is that 
human rights are not suitable candidates for consideration as general principles. 
They are subject to a high level of political scrutiny, debate, and nuanced inter-
pretation. The fact that these unalienable rights can be limited and balanced 
against each other, that they can be derogated from in times of emergency, or 
be interpreted differently depending on the particular customs of a geographical 
region, or in the light of the parallel application of the laws of armed conflict, 
all seem to suggest that they cannot be deemed indispensable generalized max-
ims of foundational law. 
Accepting Sourgens’s interpretation would lead to an over-expansion of 
general principles to spheres of legal activity which they were never intended to 
cover, filling gaps which they were never intended to fill. It would mean that 
any human right could now resurface as its own “co-equal source of interna-
tional law” by simply rebranding itself as a general principle. Struggling to 
abolish the death penalty in the U.S., China, and Russia? Try the “life princi-
ple” on for size. Having issues with CIA “black sites” in Poland and prolonged 
administrative detention in the U.K. and France? Don’t worry! Take the “liber-
ty principle” for a spin. Human rights obligations cannot simply be reintro-
duced through general principles. Rather, they must be interpreted within the 
bounds of their own natural habitat, examined internationally through the 
lenses of constitutional, domestic, and human rights law. 
B. A Comparative Review of Private Law in Isolation 
I have no immediate qualms with Sourgens’s selection of the six jurisdic-
tions that he chose for his review,35 but I do challenge aspects of the methodol-
 
 31. The maxim that no advantage may be gained from one’s own wrong was recognized by 
the PCIJ as a general principle in Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 9 (July 26) (where the Court concluded that it is a “principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence 
of international arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot avail himself of the fact 
that the other has not fulfilled some obligation or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the 
former Party, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from 
having recourse to the tribunal which would have been open to him.”). 
 32. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Claim for Indemnity, 1927 P.C.I.J (se. A) No. 17 (Sept. 
13) (The Court stated that the “essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular decisions of arbitral 
tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would in all probability, have existed if that act had not been commit-
ted.”). 
 33. The “separateness” of treaty provisions as a principle which may be resorted to when a 
treaty provision has become inoperable was employed by Judge Jessup in the South West Africa Cases 
(Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J . 319, 408 (Dec. 21). 
 34. For a complete list of general principles, see Bassiouni, supra note 29, at 791-801.  
 35. One can, however, raise the question of why Sourgens deemed the United States, France, 
Israel, Iran, China, and Russia to be “the key stakeholders’ jurisdictions affected by the principle to be 
proved.” Sourgens, supra note 1 at 370. Are the key stakeholders only those countries that engage in 
significant SIGINT collection? Shouldn’t the primary victims (namely those countries in the global 
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ogy of analysis employed throughout the piece. In his survey of privacy protec-
tions in the domestic laws of each of the six examined countries, Sourgens 
looks only to private law, from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to the Civil 
Codes of France, Iran, and Russia, to the Chinese Torts Liability Law, and the 
Israeli Protection of Privacy Law.36 However, Hersch Lauterpacht argues that 
in identifying general principles one must engage in “comparison, generaliza-
tion, and synthesis of rules of law in its various branches – private and public, 
constitutional, administrative, and procedural.”37 One cannot simply engage in 
cherry-picking, reading a single private law statute in a vacuum separate from 
the general system. This is of specific importance in light of the fact that the 
subject of review is governmental espionage, an area inherently governed by 
public law and public policy. To look at the private law conceptualization of 
privacy in each of these systems, in isolation from the public law exceptions 
enshrined therein, would be “doing violence to the fundamental concepts of any 
of those systems.”38 
Take as an example the Israeli case study. Sourgens correctly cites to Ar-
ticle 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law of 1981, and accurately finds that the 
law “makes infringement of privacy a civil wrong.”39 However, he ignores two 
key points. First, the law (as is true for all the other civil laws examined by 
Sourgens) only applies territorially. The privacy protections enumerated therein 
do not apply to a non-national in a foreign country, let alone in cases where the 
infringing party is an agency of the State operating under statutory authoriza-
tion. Second, and relatedly, Sourgens’s analysis stops before introducing the 
readers to Article 19 of the same law titled “Exemption.” That Article reads, in 
relevant part: 
“19. . . . . (b) A security authority or a person employed by it or acting on its behalf 
shall bear no responsibility under this Law for an infringement reasonably commit-
ted within the scope of their functions and for the purpose of performance thereof. 
(c) security authority, for purpose of this section – [includes] any of the following: 
(1) the Israel Police; 
(2) the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, and 
the Military Police; 
(3) the General Security Services; 
(4) the Institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments . . . .”40 
 
south – in Africa, South America, and the Arab world), those countries with weaker cyber security ca-
pacities, and therefore the ones most affected by surveillance programs, be better represented? 
 36. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 379-82. 
 37. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 25, at 74. 
 38. H. C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 65 (2d ed. 1949) (“If any real meaning is to be 
given to the words ‘general’ or ‘universal’ and the like, the correct test would seem to be an internation-
al judge before taking over a principle from private law must satisfy himself that it is recognised in sub-
stance by all the main systems of law, and that in applying it he will not be doing violence to the funda-
mental concepts of any of those systems.”). 
 39. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 380. 
 40. Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981 SH No. 1011 p. 128 (Isr.). For an English transla-
tion, see Israel Protection of Privacy Law 5471-1981, WIPO (2014), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=347462. 
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Each of the countries surveyed by Sourgens, and in fact any country that 
engages in covert surveillance for purposes of preventing serious crime or foil-
ing terrorist threats, has similar exemptions in law. If the purpose of Sourgens’s 
review was to determine whether privacy protections exist in each of the juris-
dictions examined, he cannot simply read these statutes outside of the regulato-
ry environment in which they are situated. In other words, yes, Sourgens is cor-
rect in concluding that “the legal systems studied conceive of privacy as a 
right” and that the “right to privacy has support from a diversity of legal tradi-
tions.”41 However, this right is not extended extraterritorially by any of the 
statutes that he cites, nor do the countries surveyed see this right as a hindrance 
to either their domestic or foreign surveillance practices (quite the opposite—
there is a convergence of national security exemptions for surveillance purpos-
es). 
To justify his isolated review of private law, Sourgens confusingly relies 
on the extraterritorial nature of the operations in question,42 making the follow-
ing argument: 
“[W]hen the state acts beyond its own territory, beyond its right to regulate, it slips 
into the position of everyman. The state’s actions no longer benefit from regulatory 
right. Extraterritorial conduct of the state is thus not a priori permissible as sover-
eign prerogative, but nor is it a priori impermissible as interference in the internal 
affairs of its neighbors. Rather, in the absence of a treaty or customary international 
law rule on point, the conduct is governed by the same principles of lawful inter-
course in civil society and thus should be subject to civil law.”43 
One of Edward Snowden’s many revelations was that the United States 
used its embassy in Berlin as a listening station to monitor the communications 
of German government officials working nearby the embassy in the Regier-
ungsviertel (the Government District).44 According to Sourgens, we should 
treat the United States in this scenario as an “everyman,” subject to the German 
domestic private law regulations of privacy, thus justifying an isolated review 
of private law. But nothing is further from the truth. The United States enjoyed 
state immunity from criminal and civil prosecution and enforcement, and the 
NSA and CIA employees who engaged in the alleged surveillance activities 
were equally immune under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consu-
lar Relations. The most that Germany could do, as it eventually did, is kick 
those spymasters out of the country as persona non grata.45 To equate the Unit-
ed States in this scenario to a jealous husband spying on his ex-wife, or to an 
incredulous boss spying on his employees, is unreasonable. This episode in 
U.S.-German foreign relations was never seen, by any of the parties, as a pri-
 
 41. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 382. 
 42. This is already an unpersuasive argument, as the privacy principle is presumably supposed 
to apply equally to both domestic and foreign surveillance, so it is unclear why it can only be justified 
through foreign surveillance rationales. 
 43. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 377. 
 44. The NSA Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-
berlin-embassy-a-930205.html. 
 45. Michael B. Kelley, Germany Just Kicked Out the CIA’s Berlin Station Chief, BUS. INSIDER 
(July 10, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-
cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html. 
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vate law matter. It was solely an issue of public law, resolved using political 
and diplomatic tools. 
Moreover, at the heart of Sourgens’s analysis stands the unfortunately 
prevalent and common mischaracterization of espionage, within international 
legal literature, as not constituting a “regulatory right” subject to the “sovereign 
prerogative” of states.46 The literature has a blind spot when it comes to spying. 
In actuality, one can identify a plethora of legal sources that recognize, what I 
have termed the jus ad explorationem, a derivative, liberty right of the State to 
peacetime intelligence gathering.47 These sources include the right of states to 
survival, recognized by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (and 
the related collective right of self-determination of peoples); the laws on the use 
of force (and their recognition of a customary right for anticipatory self-
 
 46. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 377. I acknowledge in this regard that Sourgens is merely citing 
back to a mountain of works that have been produced on espionage in international law, all of which 
seem to suggest that espionage is neither legal nor illegal, operating beyond the realm of the law. This is, 
I argue, a classic case of argumentum ad populum, each scholar piggybacking on the shoulders of his 
predecessor. They all suggest that the international law of espionage is unstated, because none of them 
are creative or daring enough to state it. Thus everyone seems to believe that espionage and international 
law are strangers, simply because no one has said otherwise before. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (2009) (“[N]o 
general norm exists in international law expressly prohibiting or limiting acts of intelligence gather-
ing . . . .”); Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 
AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2004) (“Espionage is curiously ill-defined under international law, 
even though all developed nations, as well as many lesser-developed ones, conduct spying and eaves-
dropping operations against their neighbors.”); Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than 
Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 115, 116 (2014) (“[T]here is a 
long-standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between nations to ignore espionage in 
international law.”); Richard Falk, Foreword, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW v, v 
(Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962) (“[T]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime 
practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory para-
graph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate upon capture”); David Silver, Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner 
eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“There is something almost oxymoronic about addressing the legality of espionage 
under international law . . . despite the ambiguous state of espionage under international law, it is not 
specifically prohibited by treaty or other international legal mechanism.”); W. Hays Parks, The Interna-
tional Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433, 433-34 (John Norton Moore et 
al. eds., 1st ed. 1990) (“No serious proposal ever has been made within the international community to 
prohibit intelligence collection as a violation of international law because of the tacit acknowledgement 
by nations that it is important to all, and practiced by each.”); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In 
From the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1071, 1072 (2006) (“De-
spite its relative importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few treaties that deal with it 
directly. Academic literature typically omits the subject entirely, or includes a paragraph or two defining 
espionage and describing the unhappy fate of captured spies. For the most part, only special regimes 
such as the laws of war address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in 
the legal regimes dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control.”); Geoffrey Demarest, Espionage 
in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996) (“International Law regarding 
peacetime espionage is virtually unstated, and thus international law has been an inappropriate and inad-
equate reference for either condemnation or justification of actions involving intelligence gathering.”); 
Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address: State Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 28 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 543, 544 (2007) (“[M]ost lawyers would likely scoff at the notion that espionage activities are 
constrained in any meaningful way by international law. Indeed most probably believe that international 
law’s only influence on espionage is that in wartime, spies caught behind the lines out of uniform can be 
shot. Hardly a sophisticated or, to intelligence services, comforting notion.”). Most recently, the interna-
tional group of experts who worked at the invitation of the NATO Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence agreed “there is no prohibition of espionage per se” under international law. TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 168 (2d ed. 2017) 
(concluding that peacetime espionage is not per se regulated by international law). 
 47. See Lubin, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
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defense); international human rights law (and the obligation of states to respect 
and ensure the right to life, liberty, and security of all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction); international humanitarian law (and the obligation of States to de-
velop effective intelligence systems in preparation for war); collective security 
under U.N. Law (and the obligations of States under both treaty law and United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions to participate in the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security including through the sharing of intelligence to 
counter terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and to ensure the success of 
sanctions regimes); international disaster response laws and international envi-
ronmental laws (which mandate cooperation in intelligence-gathering); and in-
ternational accountability regimes (which depend on effective factual determi-
nations that, in some cases, can only be achieved through continuous 
monitoring).48 
In this short response piece, I am unable to fully engage in an analysis of 
each of these sources of law. Let me just focus on the right to anticipatory self-
defense, as an example. Dating back to the Caroline incident of 1837, the right 
of a State to engage in pre-emptive self-defense in order to avert an attack that 
is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and moment of deliber-
ation”49 has been extensively analyzed.50 Even those who still maintain, based 
on the wording of U.N. Charter Article 51, that a right of self-defense applies 
only “if an armed attack occurs,” cannot ignore diverse and robust subsequent 
practice by states.51 The 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change established by the U.N. Secretary-General thus recognized that “a 
threatened State, according to long established international law, can take mili-
tary action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
deflect it and the action is proportionate.”52 Regardless of what interpretation of 
“imminence” one adopts, from a classically restrictive “Pearl Harbor”-type po-
sition to a highly permissive “Bush doctrine”-type position,53 both ends of the 
spectrum, and everything in between, will embrace a State’s derivative right to 
 
 48. The prescriptive evidence is further backed by the function that intelligence plays in main-
taining our public world order. See generally Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael 
Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973); Baker, supra 
note 46, at 1102-11. 
 49. See generally R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L. L. 82 
(1938). 
 50. For a summary of the literature, see Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L. (Apr. 2011), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e401?prd=EPIL. 
For a more recent review of the literature, see Monica Hakimi, North Korea and the Law on Anticipa-
tory Self-Defense, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/north-korea-and-the-law-on-
anticipatory-self-defense/. 
 51. W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Pre-
emptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 525, 526 (2006) (noting that anticipatory self-defense was 
not, in their view, “in the contemplation of drafters of the Charter, though claimed by many to have been 
grafted thereon by subsequent practice,” followed by a showing of such practice through case studies). 
 52. Sec’y Gen.’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, UNITED NATIONS 63 (2004), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_ more_secure_world.pdf. 
 53. For more moderate interpretations, see Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope 
of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 769 (2012); Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law of Self-Defense, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 11, 
2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-modern-law-of-self-defence/. 
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engage in peacetime intelligence gathering. For how else will a State know 
when a threat reaches whatever level of imminence is deemed sufficient to jus-
tify military action? If a State is entitled to retaliate against imminent threats to 
its survival, by definition it must be allowed to engage in peacetime espionage 
to gather the information necessary to reach that very conclusion. Even were 
we to adopt the formalistic and anachronistic approach that only Article 51 ap-
plies (and therefore that a State may only react to an imminent threat by seek-
ing Security Council authorization) there would still be a derivative right for 
States to engage in peacetime espionage. For how else will a Delegation be able 
to prove to the Security Council that a threat is mounting, so to convince its 
members to vote in favor of an authorization of the use of force? To the extent 
that the United Nations does not have its own intelligence capacities, the Secu-
rity Council must rely on Member States in order to fulfill its mandate of main-
taining peace and security.54 We can and should debate under what circum-
stances, or by what means, the right to spy might be abused or 
disproportionally extended, but to claim that espionage is not “a priori permis-
sible as a sovereign prerogative” seems inconceivable in our public world or-
der, and it certainly ignores the realities of state practice. 
C. The Circular Fallacy in Determining Compatibility 
Sourgens’s compatibility analysis, the second test he lays out to prove the 
existence of a general principle, suffers from circular reasoning. Consider for 
example the classic circular reasoning fallacy: 
Person A: God exists. 
Person B: Why should I believe that? 
Person A: Because the Bible says God exists. 
Person B: Why should I believe anything the Bible says? 
Person A: Because the Bible is the inspired word of God. 
In this example God is true because of the Bible, and the Bible is true be-
cause of God. Put differently, the proposition is supported by the premise, 
which in turn is supported by the proposition, creating a circle in reasoning in 
which no real authority is being cited. Compare this to Sourgens’s analysis of 
the compatibility of the privacy principle with international law. 
Sourgens: A general privacy principle, distinct from the ICCPR privacy right, ex-
ists. 
Lubin: Why should I believe that? 
 
 54. In fact, even if one does not recognize the existence of a right of anticipatory self defense 
(a position held by a number of States, namely China, India, and members of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment), one must still recognize the derivative right of States’ for peacetime intelligence gathering. That 
is because, at a minimum, all States recognize the Security Council’s role in carefully assessing the im-
manency of threats to international peace and security. With the U.N. lacking any intelligence producing 
powers, how is the Security Council to exercise this function, if not through the review of intelligence 
gathered, analyzed, and disseminated to it by it members? See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND 
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
341 (2010) (identifying the states which do not recognize a right of anticipatory self defense). 
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Sourgens: Because all examined legal systems “expressly recognize a right to pri-
vacy as a matter of their private law.”55 
Lubin: Why should I believe that anything these countries legislate, as a matter of 
their private law, is a general principle of international law? 
Sourgens: Because it is compatible with the ICCPR privacy right. 
To establish the existence of the principle, Sourgens looks at domestic 
civil legislation in six jurisdictions that have adopted the right to privacy.56 
Once the principle is identified, Sourgens attempts to prove its compatibility 
with international law, by analogizing it back to the ICCPR privacy right.57 The 
proposition (that a privacy principle separate from a privacy right exists) is 
supported by the premise (that the domestic legislation of states is converging 
to recognize privacy as a principle compatible with international law). Howev-
er, that premise is then supported by the proposition (as any compatibility could 
only be drawn from relying back on the very international human right to pri-
vacy which was deemed inoperable and which launched our quest to find this 
principle in the first place). 
“Good faith,” for example, is a general principle of international law be-
cause it is compatible across different international legal fields. One can find 
good faith in treaty negotiation and interpretation, as well as in the admission of 
a state to the United Nations. One can find good faith in international environ-
mental law, as well as in the law of international adjudication.58 On the other 
hand, one can find Sourgens’s privacy principle only in the privacy right, mak-
ing his reliance on that human right to prove a general principle distinct from 
human rights a circular fallacy. 
It should therefore come as no surprise that the content of the principle it-
self merely echoes the content of the right. It is the same king wearing a differ-
ent tunic. Sourgens spends significant time in Parts IV and V analyzing differ-
ent privacy definitions and applying standards of proportionality to the newly 
found principle—but in essence the definitions and standards put forward are 
all part and parcel of the human right to privacy discourse. The privacy princi-
ple did not replace, or supplant that discourse, as Sourgens had intended it to; it 
simply reproduced it. 
But even were we to ignore all of this, and assume the existence of a pri-
vacy principle under international law, what would it all mean? If the human 
right to privacy is nothing more than a normative hope without means of ready 
legal enforcement, as Sourgens believes, what is to be said about the privacy 
principle? How is it, in any way, more enforceable? Why are the P5 more likely 
to follow this principle than they are the human right to privacy? What mecha-
nisms does this principle provide that were lacking within our existing frame-
works? These questions must be answered, as general principles of internation-
 
 55. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 378. 
 56. Id. at 379-82. 
 57. Id. at 388-391. 
 58. See generally Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, 2 UCL J. L. & JURIS. 40 
(2013). 
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al law tend to inspire more literature than practical use.59 Sourgens promises 
that privacy-as-a-principle would allow us to overcome the treaty-based limita-
tions that hinder the effectiveness of the privacy right.60 However, he ignores 
the fact that once we stop using human rights law as our grounds for finding a 
violation, we can no longer rely on human rights mechanisms and institutions 
to demand accountability (such as the human rights treaty bodies, the regional 
human rights courts, and the Human Rights Council and its Special Proce-
dures). Note in this regard that the introduction of a privacy principle (on top of 
the treaty and customary individual rights to privacy) could potentially cause 
further fragmentation in international law, with different layers of legal protec-
tions and obligations colliding. Such fragmentation is likely to lead to less, ra-
ther than more, protection of privacy in the long haul. Sourgens therefore bears 
the burden of proving that the introduction of a privacy principle will lead to an 
overall increase in privacy protection. A burden he has not met. 
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: THE ONE TRUE HEIR TO THE THRONE 
International human rights law is certainly not a panacea for all the 
world’s ills and misfortunes. As William Burke-White has noted, “promotion 
of human rights has long been viewed as a luxury, to be pursued when the 
Government has spare diplomatic capacity and national security is not being 
jeopardized.”61 Sourgens’s account of the limited effectiveness of the human 
right to privacy must be considered within this context. I will argue that dis-
counting the many milestones and success stories of recent years does a disser-
vice to the privacy agenda. It is also unhelpful to overplay archaic arguments 
about the application of human rights treaties’ extraterritorially, or to overem-
phasize the refusal of certain superpowers to ratify fundamental human rights 
treaties. I address each of these points in turn. 
A. The Evolution of the International Privacy Agenda 
The international community has taken significant steps to enhance priva-
cy protections since the signing of the ICCPR in 1966 and the Human Rights 
Committee’s adoption of General Comment No. 16 on the right to privacy in 
1988.62 These accomplishments include, since 1999, a significant body of work 
on human rights and surveillance practices by the U.N. High Commissioner for 
 
 59. MANLEY OTTMER HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-
1942: A TREATISE 609 (1943) (noting that general principles in practice have loomed “less large” than 
in the literature which they have inspired and suggesting that this could be owed to “a sense of caution” 
taken by the PCIJ in their application). 
 60. Sourgens, supra note 1, at 406 (“The Privacy Principle is an international legal prescrip-
tion that can be applied to signals intelligence efforts. It thus transforms signals intelligence from a 
space currently suffering from fragmented international legal rules at best, or a complete vacuum of le-
gal rules at worst, into a sphere governable by general international law. The Privacy Principle does so 
by vindicating privacy rights in reasonable expectations of seclusion of private citizens as anchored in 
the private laws of leading global legal systems”). 
 61. William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correla-
tion, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 251 (2004). 
 62. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 16, Twenty-second session, 1988, p.21 U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 
(Right to Privacy), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 21 (Apr. 8, 1988). 
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Human Rights and the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression 
and Counter-Terrorism.63 The repeated adoption of both U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolutions and U.N. Human Rights Council Resolutions, by consensus, on 
the right to privacy in the digital age also marks a significant step forward.64 
The 2015 creation of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy is itself 
a reaffirmation of the international privacy agenda, and his reports to the Coun-
cil further signify the importance of his new role as an international intelligence 
watchdog.65 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has begun to routinely address 
surveillance legislation and practices in its Concluding Observations to States, 
beginning in 2014.66 On the regional level, the European Court of Human 
 
 63. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 
2009); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opin-
ion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17 
(June 4, 2012); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013); Rep. of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 
2014); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opin-
ion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 
(May 11, 2016); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/61 (Feb. 21, 2017). 
 64. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/69/166 (Dec. 18, 2014); U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/L.27 (Mar. 24, 2015); U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/RES/71/199 (Dec. 19, 2016); U.N. Human Rights 
Council Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/L.7/Rev.1. See also 
U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution on the Safety of Journalists, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/L.6 (Sept. 
26, 2016). 
 65. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64 
(Mar. 8, 2016); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, U.N. Doc. A/71368 (Aug. 30, 
2016). For a critique of the work of the Special Rapporteur to date, see Marc Rotenberg, Urgent Man-
date, Unhurried Response: An Evaluation of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, 3 EUR. 
DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 47 (2017). 
 66. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the United States of 
America, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014); Concluding Ob-
servations on the Initial Periodic Rep. of Malawi, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/MWI/CO/1/Add.1 (Aug. 19, 2014); Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Rep. of Sri 
Lanka, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LKA/CO/5 (Nov. 21, 2014); Concluding Obser-
vations on the Seventh Periodic Rep. of the Russian Federation, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 (Apr. 28, 2015); Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Canada, 
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (Aug. 13, 2015); Concluding Observations 
on the Third Periodic Rep. of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Human Rights Committee, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/3 (Aug. 17, 2015); Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Rep. of 
France, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5 (Aug. 17, 2015); Concluding Obser-
vations on the Seventh Periodic Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 (Aug. 17, 2015); Concluding Observations 
on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4 (Dec. 3, 2015); Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Rep. of Namibia, 
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NAM/CO/2 (Apr. 22, 2016); Concluding Observations 
on the Initial Rep. of South Africa, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ZAF/CO/1 (Apr. 27, 
2016); Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Rep. of Sweden, Human Rights Committee, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/7 (Apr. 28, 2016); Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of 
New Zealand, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NZL/CO/6 (Apr. 28, 2016); Concluding 
Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of Rwanda, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/RWA/CO/4 (May 2, 2016); Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Denmark, 
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/6 (Aug. 15, 2016); Concluding Observations 
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Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the Inter-American 
Commission and Court on Human Rights have developed considerable and au-
thoritative jurisprudence on surveillance and privacy.67 
For a legal positivist, these advancements might seem insignificant, as 
most of the above are soft law or regional instruments without the binding ef-
fect of black-letter texts. Nonetheless, they have had profound impacts on the 
practice of intelligence agencies. Consider the following anecdotal examples: 
Canada’s 2016 decision to temporarily halt intelligence sharing with its Five 
Eyes partners following revelations of unlawful surveillance of Canadians;68 
the launch in 2014 of the German Parliamentary Committee investigating the 
NSA spying scandal (the final report of which is currently being written) which 
has already led to a reduction in BND-NSA cooperation,69 as well as to various 
 
on the Seventh Periodic Rep. of Colombia, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/AZE/CO/4 
(Nov. 4, 2016); Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Morocco, Human Rights Com-
mittee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6 (Nov. 4, 2016); Concluding Observations on the Seventh Peri-
odic Rep. of Poland, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/POL/CO/7 (Nov. 4, 2016); Con-
cluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Italy, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6 (Mar. 28, 2017); Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Rep. of Turk-
menistan, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/TKM/CO/2 (Mar. 28, 2017). For further read-
ing see Yuval Shany, On-Line Surveillance in the Case-law of the UN Human Rights Committee, He-
brew University Cyber Security Research Center (July 2017), http://csrcl.huji.ac.il/people/line-
surveillance-case-law-un-human-rights-committee (noting that “whereas questions relating to [surveil-
lance] were raised with respect to two states between 2007-2014, since 2014 they have been addressed 
with respect to 15 different states (representing more than 25% of the states reviewed by the Committee 
during this period). This sharp rise is suggestive both of the growing resort to on-line surveillance pow-
ers by governments due to advances in available technology, and of growing awareness to their human 
rights implications by the Committee.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Klass & Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, European Court of Human 
Rights, Judgment (Sept. 6, 1978); Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, European Court of Human 
Rights, Judgment (Mar. 25, 1998); Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, European Court 
of Human Rights, Decision on Admissibility (June 29, 2006); Liberty and Others v. The United King-
dom, App. No. 58243/00, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (July 1, 2008); Kennedy v. Unit-
ed Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (May 18, 2010); Uzun v. 
Germany, App. No. 35623/05, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (Sept. 2, 2010); Szabó & 
Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (Jan. 12, 2016); 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister of Communications, Marine & Natural Resources et al. (C-
293/12); Kärntner Landesregierung and others (C-594/12), Joined Cases, Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union, Grand Chamber, Judgment (Apr. 8, 2014); Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commis-
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cases being brought in German Courts;70 the U.S. ruling finding Section 215 on 
bulk metadata collection illegal;71 and recent amendments to Section 702 poli-
cies.72 
Just imagine you could go back in time to the middle of the Cold War and 
suggest to a KGB agent that in 2015 the European Court of Human Rights 
would rule that Russian surveillance policies constituted an unnecessary and 
disproportionate interference with privacy rights. That KGB agent would have 
probably thought you were mad. Those were different times, as David Corn-
well writes. It was a time when individuals 
were being shadowed, their phones were being tapped, their cars and houses 
bugged, neighbors suborned. Their letters were arriving a day late, their husbands, 
wives, and lovers were reporting on them, they couldn’t park their cars without get-
ting a ticket. The taxman was after them and there were men who didn’t look at all 
like real workmen doing something to the drains outside the house, they’d be loiter-
ing there all week and achieved nothing.73 
It was a world in which spying was conducted without statutory limita-
tions or parliamentary oversight, without minimization procedures or structured 
safeguards, without transparency mandates or notification obligations, without 
ex ante independent authorizations or ex post effective review. We have human 
rights defenders and digital rights activists to thank for their relentless hard 
work in changing our entire conceptualization of the practice of intelligence 
agencies and their public legal relationship with the people who they purport to 
serve. 
Human rights advocacy is not for the fainthearted. The tools at the dis-
posal of advocates are limited to different forms of agitation and the application 
of pressure through strategic litigation, investigative reporting, shaming cam-
paigns, public awareness initiatives, and network building. It is a slow and 
painstaking process. The impact is gradual and often feels miniscule. Political 
events might turn years of hard work on its head. Recent ISIS-inspired terrorist 
attacks across the European continent have brought with them a new wave of 
mass surveillance legislation across EU member states, which stands in stark 
contradiction to the human rights protections laid down by the regional 
courts.74 But this setback should not be a reason to give up on the human rights 
agenda. The great Louis Henkin wrote that “human rights” is not a single idea, 
but rather, it is “the sum of pairs of ideas in tension.”75 Privacy and security are 
one of those pairings, and in this ultimate tug of war, there are continuous un-
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dercurrents and dynamics at play. One should not be tempted to forego the 
cause, simply because at any specific moment in time one of the dyads seems 
to be pushing stronger in a specific direction. 
B. The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Right to Privacy 
Arguments about extraterritoriality are at the heart of Sourgens’s disen-
chantment with IHRL. These arguments must not be overplayed and should all 
be taken with a grain of salt. Rather than surrender, we must vehemently op-
pose the teatro de la comedia that surrounds the anarchic arguments, still being 
raised by a number of countries76 and scholars,77 in support of a territorially 
constrained conception of human rights. It has now been firmly established that 
states must respect and ensure human rights to all individuals subject to their 
jurisdiction, regardless of whether those individuals are situated within that 
state’s territory.78 As Marko Milanovic has framed it, this is indeed a funda-
mental element of the “moral logic of human rights law,”79 which triggers 
states’ human rights obligations wherever they purport to exercise a certain de-
gree of control. In this regard, most foreign surveillance programs involve ac-
tions by public authorities of the State within its own territory and subject to its 
effective control. Consider for example the PRISM program, which involves 
the collection of internet communications under Section 702 from at least nine 
major U.S. internet companies.80 The collection, retention, analysis, and later 
dissemination of information are all conducted by U.S. government officials, in 
U.S. Government facilities, subject to the U.S. Government’s effective control. 
The fact that the targets are foreign nationals residing in foreign territory cannot 
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serve as the basis for claiming that the individuals have not come within U.S. 
jurisdiction for the purposes of IHRL application in the context of this program.  
Moreover, contrary to Sourgens’s portrayal, the fact is that the United 
States has never expressly stated its position as to whether the human rights 
treaties apply to its foreign surveillance programs. The Privacy and Civil Liber-
ties Oversight Board left this matter unresolved.81 If anything, Presidential Pol-
icy Directive 28, seems to point in the direction of recognition of (some) priva-
cy obligations.82 Regardless of the U.S. position on this matter, the U.N. 
General Assembly,83 the Human Rights Committee,84 the Venice Commis-
sion,85 and the Court of Justice of the European Union86 have all recognized the 
applicability of human rights obligations to foreign surveillance programs (al-
beit not always explicitly). 
More interestingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, in the 10 Human Rights 
NGOs v. United Kingdom case, currently pending before the European Court of 
Human Rights (which directly concerns the legality of global mass surveillance 
programs, including Tempora, PRISM, and Upstream), the U.K. Government 
did not even challenge the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR. Instead, 
both the Applicants and the Respondent ignored the issue altogether, tacitly ac-
cepting that the obligation to respect and ensure the right to privacy was trig-
gered by the nature and scope of the disputed programs. 
But even if foreign surveillance programs do not trigger the ICCPR’s ap-
plicability, the right to privacy is additionally part of customary international 
law, and its applicability to foreign surveillance programs can be derived from 
customary law. As Rengel notes: 
[g]iven the extensive amount of recognition in international instruments of the right 
to privacy, the prominent place that the topic of privacy continues to occupy in writ-
ings and commentary, and the treatment as binding norm that the right to privacy 
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has received in both national and international legal systems, it can be concluded 
that there is a general fundamental right to privacy under customary international 
law. Although the need for protection of the right to privacy continues to expand, it 
appears that in certain contexts there is widespread recognition that the right to pri-
vacy protects individuals from the actions of the state and third parties infringing on 
that right.87 
For this reason alone, there is no need to revert to a general principle of 
international law. Even in a country like China, which is not party to the 
ICCPR, the customary protections of privacy would mean that any state action 
“must be reviewed with the presumption that the state’s interference is only 
permitted in situations where there are compelling governmental interests at 
stake,”88 applying general standards of necessity, reasonableness and propor-
tionality. 
IV. PRIVACY AND MASS SURVEILLANCE: A KINGDOM IN SEARCH OF A 
PARADIGM SHIFT 
Standing at the heart of Sourgens’s piece is a claim that I am very sympa-
thetic to–there is a need for a “paradigm shift” in the discourse surrounding 
foreign mass surveillance and the right to privacy. In other words, there is a 
need to ensure that the human rights frameworks developed by treaty bodies, 
regional courts, and special rapporteurs are not only normatively compelling 
but also offer a realistic means of protecting global privacy rights while taking 
into account the legitimate security needs of States. While I raised concerns 
about the solution proposed by Sourgens, I am grateful for his effort to advo-
cate for creative thinking around this problem.  
 In a recent Article, I too recognized the growing and troubling gap “be-
tween the practice of State surveillance agencies and the deep-seated commit-
ments of human rights experts.”89 The way to bridge this gap, in my opinion, is 
not through the introduction of an external privacy principle, but rather through 
a shift in thinking within the human rights community on privacy protections in 
the foreign surveillance context: not a Privacy Principle, but a Principled Pri-
vacy Right. 
While human rights experts continue to adamantly uphold the myth of a 
universal right to privacy, in actuality a different operational code has already 
emerged in which “our” right to privacy is routinely distinguished from 
“theirs.” There is one set of privacy protections for those within the State’s ter-
ritory, and another set of lower protections (if any) for those outside the territo-
ry. “This distinction is a common feature in the wording of electronic commu-
nications surveillance laws and the practice of signals intelligence collection 
agencies, and it is further legitimized . . . by the steadfast support of the laymen 
general public.”90 
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In the article, I contend that there are justifications for the distinction. 
Discrepancies in jurisdictional reach and technological capacities make it nec-
essary to allow Governments greater leniency in adopting certain foreign sur-
veillance policies. In the name of an absolutist battle for universality, human 
rights defenders are losing the far bigger war. Stepping outside the shouting 
matches and binary splits that characterize so much of the privacy versus secu-
rity discourse, I suggest that we focus our attention not on one-size-fits-all reg-
ulation of domestic and foreign surveillance, but rather expand our thinking to 
take into account the needs of intelligence agencies as they engage in extraterri-
torial surveillance for national security purposes.91 This regulatory shift is more 
likely to bring States into the fold and ultimately serve what Sourgens identifies 
as a need for developing “a policy tool as well as a legal limit on state conduct” 
in the sphere of foreign intelligence gathering.92 It will offer a mediating reme-
dy to the data-obsessed surveillance state in an age where “politics are subordi-
nated to a kind of algorithmic authoritarianism.”93 
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